南都学坛

法人机关理论并不排斥董事对债权人独立承担责任，新《中华人民共和国公司法》的教义学重点应当转向涉董事个人责任的条文关系处理与组织法逻辑揭示上。传统行为法逻辑中第三人侵害债权理论、特殊侵权责任说、代位权理论均不能充分关照公司权力结构与信义义务等组织法逻辑。在组织法逻辑下，公司内部权力结构使董事因股东会决议而享有免责或减责抗辩权，且对于公司控制程度不同的董事应当存在梯度化的责任设计。在公司正常经营中，信义义务通过转介机制将董事承担责任的行为样态限定为职务懈怠行为，将损害类型限定为间接损害。在临近破产时，董事因信义义务对象的变化而负担有申请破产、防止不当交易、积极拯救公司等特殊义务样态。而行为法的逻辑受制于因果关系与加害行为的认定，《中华人民共和国民法典》第一千一百六十五条仅在部分情形可与《中华人民共和国公司法》第一百九十一条构成请求权竞合而发挥债权人救济作用。

The theory of corporate organs does not exclude the independent liability of directors to creditors, and the doctrinal focus of the new Company Law of the People's Republic of China should be shifted to the treatment of the relationship between the provisions and the logic of the organizational law involving the personal liability of directors. The theory of third-party infringement of claims, the theory of special tort liability and the theory of subrogation rights in the traditional behavioral law logic cannot fully take care of the organizational logic of the company's power structure and fiduciary obligations. Under the logic of organizational law, the internal power structure of the company enables directors to enjoy the defense of exemption from or reduction of liability due to the resolution of the shareholders' meeting, and there should be a graded liability design for directors with different degrees of control over the company. In the normal operation of the company, the fiduciary duty limits the type of behavior for which the director is liable to negligence in office through the referral mechanism, and limits the type of damage to indirect damage. When approaching bankruptcy, the directors are burdened with special obligations such as filing for bankruptcy, preventing improper transactions, and actively rescuing the company due to the change of the object of the fiduciary duty. However, the logic of behavioral law is limited by the determination of causality and damaging behavior, and Article 1165 of the Civil Code can play a role in creditor's relief by competing with Article 191 of the Company Law only in some cases.